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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No. 940115-CA 
v. : 
ROGER VAN CLEAVE : Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his second degree felony burglary conviction. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Since defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the 
evidence, should this Court decline to consider his insufficiency claim? If not, and 
the merits are considered, was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of 
burglary? "When challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the 
evidence supporting that verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient 
to support the conviction." State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) 
(citing State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App.1990)). When a defendant fails 
to meet this marshaling burden, this Court will decline to consider an insufficiency 
claim. 14. 
When a jury verdict is challenged on insufficiency grounds, this Court reviews 
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [This Court will] 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Burk. 839 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did defendant's failure to object to the trial court's instructions 
constitute waiver under the invited error doctrine and preclude appellate review? 
If not, did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding the mental state 
required for a defendant to be convicted as a party to burglary? Under the invited 
error doctrine, "a party cannot take advantage [on appeal] of an error committed at trial 
when that party led the court into committing the error." State v. Tillman, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). Failure to object at trial, as the result of a "consciously 
chosen strategy" rather than "oversight", constitutes "conscious waiver" and precludes 
appellate review of the issue. State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah), 
cert.denied. 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
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"[A]bsent a timely objection, [this Court] will review an alleged error . . . only 
if it constitutes 'plain error'." State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989). In 
State v. Reyes. 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court reiterated a 
three-step test for plain error: 
To establish plain error, a party must show the following: (1) an error 
exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) 
the error was harmful, or in other words, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the complaining 
party. . . . The claim of plain error fails if any one of these requirements 
is not shown. 
I$L at 1057 (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde. 
770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1996): 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) (1996): 
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in 
a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on any person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an amended information with burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1996), and theft, a second 
3 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1996) (R. 117-18). He was 
convicted of both counts in a jury trial, and sentenced to concurrent terms of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, to be served concurrently with a sentence he was 
then serving (R. 103-05). Defendant appeals only his burglary conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 235. 
Defendant was hired by M.C. Green & Sons Construction in late June 1993 (R. 
191). His first job with the company was on a crew pouring concrete for a patio and 
driveway at the home of William S. Kjar in Centerville, Utah (R. 191-92). So that the 
workers could have access to electrical outlets, the side door to the garage at the home 
was always left open (R. 183, 196, 197-99, 205, 211). 
Mr. Kjar and the crew foreman discussed the Kjars' upcoming month-long 
vacation several times in the presence of defendant and the work crew (R. 163, 182). 
On Wednesday, June 30, two days after defendant started the job and while he was at 
their home, Mr. Kjar, his wife, and their seven children departed for the airport (R. 
164). Two days later was the Fourth of July weekend, and the crew did no work that 
Saturday, Sunday, or Monday (R. 181). The last time defendant worked on the job 
was Tuesday, July 6 (R. 181-82, 186). 
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On Monday, July 5, a neighbor boy who was taking care of the Kjar's house 
during their absence, went into the garage to turn off the sprinklers (R. 210, 213). He 
did not notice anything unusual. I$L But when he went into the garage late the 
following day, Tuesday, July 6, the neighbor boy noticed for the first time that the 
locked door leading from the garage into the house had been forced open, damaging the 
door frame (R. 205, 208-09). He told his father, and they called the police (R. 207-08, 
211; 215-16). 
Since seven children lived in the house, and because it was in somewhat disarray 
as a result of the Kjars' hasty departure, police investigators were unable to determine 
what property, if any, had been taken from the home (R. 265, 269, 277-78). A relative 
could not identify whether anything was missing, and typical targets of thieves, like 
computers and stereo equipment, had not been disturbed (R. 270). Indeed, police did 
not find anything obviously missing (R. 265, 269). For these reasons, investigators did 
not look for fingerprints (R. 277-78). 
After the Kjars returned from their vacation at the end of July, Mr. Kjar 
identified and reported (R. 166, 270) the following items missing from his home: 
- a .22 Winchester pump rifle and case (State's Exhibits 2 and 3; R. 167-68, 
169); 
- a 3/4-size guitar (State's Exhibit 4; R. 168-69); 
- a Yamaha 12-string guitar and case (State's Exhibit 5; R. 169-70); 
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- a black JBL speaker (State's Exhibit 6; R. 170); 
- a Yamaha six-input power mixer (State's Exhibit 6; R. 170); 
- and a Kawasaki 1400 generator (R. 173). 
A chain saw was also identified as missing following the burglary (R. 276). 
At 2:00 p.m. on Monday, July 5, defendant went to Davis Pistol & Loan, in 
Clearfield, Utah, the only pawn shop open on that day in northern Utah because of the 
Fourth of July holiday (R. 221, 223-24), and pawned the .22 Winchester pump rifle 
and case, the Yamaha 12-string guitar, the Yamaha six-input power mixer, and the 
black JBL speaker for $250.00 (R. 222-230, 234). Defendant entered an address on 
the pawn cards that was false (R. 244-45, 299, 301-02, 306-07, 318, 326). 
At 2:30 p.m. that day, defendant gave $100 to his sister-in-law towards a 
payment for a car he was buying from her (R. 275-76; b_ui ££g_ R. 245-46, 248, 253, 
324). At about 10:00 p.m. that same day, defendant gave his sister-in-law the 3/4-size 
guitar (State's Exhibit 4; R. 247-49), telling her that he had bought it from a "friend" 
for $5.00 (R. 249). The guitar was valued at $250.00 (R. 168-69, 285). 
The Kawasaki 1400 generator and the cham saw were never recovered (R. 276). 
After investigators were able to trace the stolen property to defendant, and he 
was charged, his sister-in-law asked him what he did (R. 250, 271). Defendant said, "I 
didn't do anything. I didn't realize that the guitar was stolen." (R. 250). She 
responded, "Well, they are saying that you've burglarized a house." LL Defendant 
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responded, "I did not do it, Lisa. I did not do it", adding that a friend of his did it and 
asked him to go out and pawn the stuff (R. 251). When his sister-in-law asked, "Do 
you know who did it?", defendant said, "Yeah, I know who did it." I&. When she 
pressed him for the name, defendant said he would not give it to her, adding that it was 
the job of the police and prosecutor to find out, and that it was not his job to tell them. 
&L 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Since defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the 
evidence, this Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. Even if the 
merits are considered, the evidence is sufficient to support defendant's conviction 
for burglary. Defendant conceded at trial that a burglary occurred and that he pawned 
or gave away most of the items taken immediately after the burglary. But he argues 
now, as he did then, that there was no evidence he entered the house. However, 
defendant's marshaling of the evidence on appeal omits critical facts. Because 
defendant has failed to meet his burden of marshaling the evidence, this Court should 
decline to consider his claim. Even if the merits are considered, together with proof of 
the burglary and theft and defendant's possession of the stolen property, the omitted 
facts are sufficient corroborating circumstances to establish defendant's guilt for the 
burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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2. Defendant's failure to object to the trial court's instructions constituted 
waiver under the invited error doctrine, and precludes appellate review. In any 
event, the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the mental state 
required for a defendant to be convicted as a party to burglary. Defendant 
contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to adequately instruct the 
jury on the mental state required to be a "party" to burglary, and that this failure was 
plain error requiring reversal. Defendant's failure to object to the instructions as given 
or to request additional instructions constituted invited error, precluding appellate 
review of his current claim. In any event, since Instruction Nos. 15, 18, and 22 
adequately addressed the mental state required to be a "party" to burglary, there was no 
error, let alone plain error. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
SINCE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, THIS COURT SHOULD 
DECLINE TO CONSIDER HIS INSUFFICBENCY CLAIM; EVEN 
IF THE MERITS ARE CONSIDERED, THE EVIDENCE IS 
SUFFICBENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
BURGLARY 
Defendant conceded at trial that the evidence established that a burglary and theft 
occurred and that he pawned or gave away most of the items taken immediately after 
8 
the burglary (R. 336-39). But he argues now, as he did then, that there was no 
evidence he ever entered the house (R. 337; Def. Br. at 17).1 
Defendant's marshaling of the evidence on appeal omits five critical facts: 
(1) defendant entered an address on the pawn cards for the stolen property that he knew 
to be false (R. 244-45, 299, 301-02, 306-07, 318, 326); (2) he volunteered that he 
bought a guitar (valued at $250.00 -- R. 168-69, 285) from a "friend" for $5.00 (R. 
249); (3) he then said that he did not know the guitar was stolen (R. 250); (4) he later 
said that a "friend" committed the burglary, and he only pawned the items as a favor 
(R. 250-51); and (5) he failed to identify his "friend" or "friends" when faced with two 
felony convictions (R. 251). Because he omitted these facts, defendant has failed to 
meet his burden of marshaling the evidence, and this Court should decline to consider 
his claim. Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l (citing Moore, 802 P.2d at 739) ("When 
challenging a jury verdict, a defendant must marshal all the evidence supporting that 
verdict and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. 
Because defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden, we likewise decline to 
consider this claim.") 
In any event, together with proof of the burglary and theft and defendant's 
possession of the stolen property, the omitted facts are sufficient corroborating 
1
 Defendant could have been found guilty as a party to the burglary even if the 
jury were not convinced he personally entered the dwelling (Instruction Nos. 15 and 
18; R, 58, 62; Utah Code Ann. 76-2-202 (1996)). 
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circumstances to establish defendant's guilt for the burglary beyond a reasonable doubt 
(see Instruction No. 19, R. 63-64). 
The United States Supreme Court wrote, with approval, "For centuries courts 
have instructed juries that an inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact 
of unexplained possession of stolen goods." Barnes v. United States. 93 S.Ct. 2357, 
2362 (1973). Utah Code Annotated §76-6-402(1) (1995) provides: "Possession of 
property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property." 
The Utah Supreme Court has regularly affirmed convictions based on such an 
inference. See, £ ^ , State vT graves, 717 P.2d 717 (Utah 1986); State v. Sessions. 
583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978); State v. Kirkman. 432 P.2d 638 (Utah 1967); State v. 
Merritt. 247 P. 497 (Utah 1926). 
Similarly, Utah appellate courts have consistently approved jury instructions 
articulating such a permissible inference. See, e.g.. State v. Smith. 726 P.2d 1232, 
1234-35 (Utah 1986); State v. Perez. 924 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah App. 1996). Defendant 
has not challenged the jury instruction dealing with the permissible inference in this 
case (R. 297, 327 — defendant neither objected to the instructions as proposed or given, 
nor did he request additional instructions). That instruction read: 
If you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was in possession of stolen property, that such possession 
was not too remote in point of time from the theft, and that the defendant 
10 
1234. 
made no satisfactory explanation of such possession, then you may infer 
from those facts that the defendant committed the theft. 
You may use the same inference, if you find it justified by the 
evidence, to connect the possessor of recently stolen property with the 
offense of burglary.2 
However, the mere possession of stolen property unexplained by 
the person in possession is not in and of itself sufficient to justify a 
conviction of theft of the property or of a burglary. It is, however, a 
circumstance to be considered in connection with the other evidence in the 
case in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the possessor. 
Such possession is a circumstance tending in some degree to show 
guilt, although it is not sufficient, standing alone and unsupported by 
other evidence to warrant a conviction. In addition to the proof of the 
burglary, of the theft, and of the possession of the property, there must be 
proof of corroborating circumstances tending of themselves to show guilt. 
Such corroborating circumstances may consist of the acts, conduct, 
falsehoods, if any, or other declarations, if any, of the defendant which 
tend to show his guilt} 
In this connection you may consider the defendant's conduct, any 
false or contradictory statements, and any other statements the defendant 
may have made with reference to the property. If the defendant gives a 
false account of how he acquired possession of the stolen property, this is 
a circumstance that may tend to show guilt.4 It is the exclusive province 
of the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the 
evidence in this case warrant an inference which the law permits the jury 
to draw from the possession of recently stolen property. You must 
always keep in mind that the defendant is presumed to be innocent and 
may not be convicted unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he is guilty. 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court approved this precise language in Smith. 726 P.2d at 
3
 This is essentially identical to language which was also approved in Smith, 726 
P.2d at 1235 (citing State v. Heath. 492 P.2d 978, 979 (1972)). 
4
 This language was likewise cited with approval in Smith. 726 P.2d at 1235 
n.l. 
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Instruction No. 19, R. 63-64 (emphasis added). 
A. Failure to marshal. The corroborating circumstances neglected by defendant 
in his marshaling of the facts will be discussed separately below: 
1. Defendant entered an address on the pawn cards for the stolen property 
which he knew to be false. According to his brother and sister-in-law, defendant lived 
in the Pepperidge apartments in Layton, Utah on July 5 (R. 244-45, 318). He had lived 
with them in Clearfield after moving to Utah from New Mexico in February or March, 
but moved out sometime in May (R. 243-45). From May until July 2 or 3, defendant 
lived with a friend and his fiancee at 1080 South 1500 East, Apartment 58, in 
Clearfield, Utah (R. 306-09). On July 5, on the pawn cards for the stolen property, 
defendant entered his address as "1780 South 250 East" in Clearfield, Utah (State's 
Exhibits 5 and 6; R. 244, 301-02, 315). Although his brother's and sister-in-law's 
address was 1780 South 200 East in Clearfield, the 250 East address would have been 
in a housing division near their apartment (R. 243-44). Defendant had not lived with 
his brother and sister-in-law at their address for two months (R. 243-45). The fact that 
defendant entered a false address on the pawn cards when he pawned the stolen 
property is a circumstance that tends to show guilty knowledge. 
2. Defendant volunteered that he bought a guitar (valued at $250.00) from a 
"friend" for $5.00. When he gave the 3/4 guitar to his sister-in-law the day of the 
burglary, defendant volunteered that he had gotten it from a friend for $5.00 (R. 249). 
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This same guitar (State's Exhibit 4) was valued at $250.00 (R. 168-69, 285). 
Defendant's explanation about purchasing an item for what amounted to l/50th its value 
is an additional circumstance tending to demonstrate his knowledge that the item was 
stolen. 
3. Defendant later said that he did not know the guitar was stolen. Two months 
before trial, when his sister-in-law asked him about what he did, defendant told her he 
"didn't realize that the guitar was stolen" (R. 250). Coupled with his earlier 
explanation about his purchase of the guitar (for a fraction of its value) (R. 249), and 
his providing a false address when pawning other items taken during the same burglary 
(State's Exhibits 5 and 6; R. 244, 301-02, 315), defendant's assertion of ignorance is 
yet another corroborating circumstance tending to show guilty knowledge. 
4. Defendant then said that a "friend" committed the burglary, and he only 
pawned the items as a favor. During this same pretrial conversation with his sister-in-
law, defendant told her that his "friend" had stolen the items and had asked him to 
pawn the stuff as a favor (R. 251). This third explanation is inconsistent with the first 
two: it contradicts defendant's first explanation about his purchase of the guitar, and it 
contradicts his second explanation about not knowing the guitar was stolen. In addition, 
this explanation does not account for all of the stolen property since defendant did not 
pawn the 3/4 guitar, the Kawasaki 1400 generator, or the chain saw (R. 234-35, 276). 
Further, it is inconsistent with the pawnbroker's testimony that defendant initially 
13 
pawned only the rifle and 12-string guitar (R. 224-26), but returned to pawn the JBL 
speaker and Yamaha mixer (R. 229-30) saying he "needed to have more money" (R. 
229). 
Finally, the explanation that a "friend" did it and asked him to pawn the items 
suggests that defendant was a party to the burglary. Indeed, the time and location of 
the burglary, defendant's knowledge of the victims' absence, his entry of a false 
address on the pawn cards and piecemeal pawning of only some of the items, and his 
contradictory explanations about his possession of the stolen property, tend to 
corroborate that defendant himself was the burglar. 
5. Defendant failed to identify his "friend" or "friends" when faced with two 
felony convictions. When defendant's sister-in-law asked if he knew who committed 
the burglary, defendant replied, "Yeah, I know who did it." (R. 251). When she 
pressed him to reveal the "real" perpetrator, defendant said he would not tell her, 
adding that it was the job of the police and prosecutor to find out, and that it was not 
his job to tell them. Id. 
Although he had no obligation to present evidence of any kind and a 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the information defendant purportedly 
possessed was not self-incriminating: according to defendant it was exculpatory.5 The 
5
 Defendant laments the lack of effort by the police to obtain fingerprints at the 
Kjar's home which "precluded Defendant from obtaining potentially exculpatory 
evidence that might have tended to show his innocence." (Def. Br. at 17 n.2). On the 
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Utah Supreme Court has noted: 
[there is] a duty upon the one in possession of such [stolen] property to 
explain his possession if he is to remove [the] adverse inference against 
him pointing toward his guilt; and if he gives a false account of how he 
acquired that possession, or having a reasonable opportunity to show that 
his possession was honestly acquired he refuses or fails to do so, such 
conduct is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury along with 
all other evidence bearing upon the case in determining guilt or 
innocence. 
Kirkham. 432 P.2d at 639 (emphasis added); S££ alSQ Smith, 726 P.2d at 1234; Graves. 
717P.2dat718. 
Defendant has failed to marshal the very facts that, taken together, corroborate 
his identity as the burglar. Because defendant has failed to meet his appellate burden of 
marshaling the facts, this Court should refuse to consider his insufficiency claim. 
Farrow. 919 P.2d at 53 n.l. 
B. Evidence sufficient. The evidence, in any event, is sufficient to support a 
guilty verdict for burglary. Defendant began work on a construction crew at the Kjars' 
home just prior to the burglary there (R. 180-82, 192-96), and "disappeared" from the 
construction crew after work the day following the burglary (R. 188). There were 
discussions in defendant's presence about the Kjar family leaving to go on vacation (R. 
contrary, defendant already knew the identity of the perpetrator (R. 251: "Yeah, I 
know who did it"). More damaging to defendant than the lack of fingerprint evidence 
was the affirmative evidence that he possessed and pawned the stolen items. Indeed, 
faced with his failure to provide police with the exculpatory information he purportedly 
possessed, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant was himself the perpetrator. 
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163, 182), and he was present when they departed their home for the airport (R. 164). 
Defendant had access to their garage through a side door that was always left open (R. 
183, 196, 197-99, 205, 211). The forced entry from the garage through the locked 
door into the house took place on a holiday weekend, only a few days after the Kjars 
had left their home vacant (R. 210-16). The only property recovered was traced to 
defendant who pawned or gave away the stolen property immediately after the burglary 
(State's Exhibits 2 - 6; R. 167-173, 222-234, 276). Defendant gave contradictory 
explanations about how he came into possession of the stolen property (R. 249-51), 
and, although he claimed he knew who committed the burglary (R. 251), defendant 
refused to provide that information to the authorities even though he was charged with 
two felonies related to the break-in. IJL Hence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, the evidence is not "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. * Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 
235.6 
6
 The case of In re J.M.H.. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1996), cited by 
defendant (Def. Br. at 17-18), may be distinguished since there was no evidence the 
defendant in that case was directly involved in the burglary. The record evidence 
reflected that J.M.H. only swapped for stolen property from the burglary at a party 
days later with the two perpetrators of the burglary he knew only by their first names. 
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Point II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED WAIVER UNDER THE INVITED 
ERROR DOCTRINE, AND PRECLUDES APPELLATE REVIEW; 
IN ANY EVENT, THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY REGARDING THE MENTAL STATE 
REQUIRED FOR A DEFENDANT TO BE CONVICTED AS A 
PARTY TO BURGLARY 
Defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to 
adequately instruct the jury on the mental state required for a defendant to be found 
guilty as a party to burglary, and that this failure was plain error requiring reversal 
(Def. Br. at 19-25). On the contrary, defendant's failure to object to the instructions as 
given or to request additional instructions constituted waiver under the invited error 
doctrine, precluding appellate review of his current claim. Even if the Court were to 
excuse defendant from his waiver, there was no error, let alone plain error, in the trial 
court's instructions. 
A. Invited error. The usual rule is that "no party may assign as error any 
portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 
1987). The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that rule 19(c) requires more than a 
general exception to the instructions. The rule "requires that the matter excepted to 
and the ground therefor be distinctly stated." State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 
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1988), revM on other grounds. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989). Where no grounds are 
apparent from the text of the instruction and no objection is stated, the objection is 
presumed waived. State v. Dumas. 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986). 
The exception to this general rule is that "notwithstanding a party's failure to 
object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid manifest injustice." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). "Manifest injustice" is determined using the plain error 
standard. State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989); accord State v. 
Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439 (Utah 1996). However, the Utah Supreme Court has refused 
to consider the manifest injustice exception where defense counsel, rather than merely 
remain silent, actively represented to the court that she had read the instruction and had 
no objection, leading the trial court to believe that nothing was wrong with the 
instruction. Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023; accord State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688 (Utah 
App. 1995) (invited error where defendant's counsel agreed that the instruction was a 
correct statement of the law and did not specifically object to the instruction, but 
merely offered an alternative). Such is the case here. 
As already noted, defendant did not object to any of the trial court's jury 
instructions as proposed or given, nor did he request additional instructions (R. 297, 
327, 348-50). Defendant nevertheless focuses his argument on what he now asserts 
was the trial court's failure to adequately respond to a jury question during 
deliberations (Def. Br. at 23-25). The jury asked: 
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What does "party" mean in regards to when a person became aware of a 
crime? Is a person a "party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime 
after it was committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand? Or 
during? Help. 
(R. 86; emphasis in original). 
During a discussion about how to respond, the trial court said, 
There has got to be a joint operation of act and intent, so we'll just refer 
them to that instruction. 
(R. 349). Defense counsel responded, 
I think that's all we can do because we don't have anything after the fact 
like we used to. 
LL When the trial court began describing his proposed instruction, he asked if both 
counsel agreed, and defense counsel said, 
All right. 
(R. 350). The trial court, without defense objection, referred the jury to a copy of 
Instruction No. 22: 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a 
union or joint operation of the act and intent. 
(R. 348-50; cL R. 67). The jury had no further questions before returning its guilty 
verdicts. 
Rather than merely remain silent, defendant's counsel actively represented to the 
court that he agreed with the instruction and had no objection, leading the trial court to 
believe that nothing was wrong with the instruction (R. 348-50). Those are the precise 
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circumstances under which the Utah Supreme Court refused to consider the manifest 
injustice exception. Mesiina, 738 P.2d at 1023. Further, defendant did not request or 
propose any additional instruction (R. 348-50). Indeed, defendant has neither asserted 
that the trial court's instructions were an incorrect statement of the law, nor has he 
proffered to this Court a " correct" instruction. In addition, defendant has not alleged 
that his counsel at trial was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's jury 
instructions. Failure to object at trial, as the result of a "consciously chosen strategy" 
rather than "oversight", constitutes "conscious waiver" and precludes appellate review 
of the issue. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59; S££ alSQ State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1995) ("Because we conclude that giving Instruction No. 26 was not 
obviously in error, if it was error at all, we do not reach the merits of defendant's claim 
because it was not preserved for appeal"). Because defendant consciously waived what 
he now asserts was error, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
B. No error. Even if this Court were to excuse defendant from his waiver, 
since Instruction Nos. 15, 18, and 22 adequately addressed the mental state required to 
be a "party" to burglary, there was no error, let alone plain error. See Reyes. 861 
P.2d at 1057. Instruction No. 15 reads: 
Before you can convict the defendant, Roger Wayne VanCleave 
[sic], of the crime of burglary as charged in the Information on file in this 
case, you must believe from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
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1. That on or before the 5th day of July, 1993, in Davis County, 
State of Utah, a dwelling in Centerville was unlawfully entered; and 
2. Whoever entered that dwelling on that occasion did so with the 
intent to commit theft; and 
3. That Roger Wayne VanCleave [sic], defendant, was a party to 
the offense referred to in paragraphs one and two; and 
4. That said Roger Wayne VanCleave [sic] acted intentionally or 
knowingly. 
If after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you 
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. If, on 
the other hand you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of burglary as charged in the Information on file in this 
case. 
(R. 58). This instruction accurately describes the statutory elements of burglary. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1996); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995) ("A person 
commits burglary if the actor 'enters or remains unlawfully in a building . . . with 
intent to commit a felony'"). Instruction No. 18 reads, in pertinent part: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of burglary, who directly commits burglary, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aides [sic] another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes burglary shall be criminally 
liable as a party for such conduct. 
Thus, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant, Roger Wayne VanCleave, was a party to the burglary 
charged in the Information you may find him guilty even though you are 
not convinced that he personally entered the dwelling. 
(R. 62). Aside from a single typo ("aides") and the substitution of the word "burglary" 
for "an offense", this language precisely tracks the statutory language regarding the 
mental state required for aider or abettor criminal liability. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-
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202 (1996). Appellate courts have consistently upheld convictions under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-202, and its predecessors. £££, £ ^ , State v. Beltran-Felix. 294 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (Utah App. 1996) (conviction upheld for aggravated sexual assault where 
defendant was not in room); State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991) 
(conviction for murder upheld where defendant was not in trailer); State v. Murphy. 26 
Utah 2d 330, 489 P.2d 430, 432 (1971) (upholding conviction under predecessor to 
section 76-2-202 where defendant was outside of store when robbery occurred); State 
v. Johnson, 6 Utah 2d 29, 305 P.2d 488, 489 (1956) (upholding conviction under 
predecessor to section 76-2-202 where defendant was seen in vicinity of crime). 
Instruction No. 22, already quoted, reads: 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a 
union or joint operation of the act and intent. 
(R. 67). This instruction accurately summarizes the statutory definitions of "intent" 
and "knowledge," which are the mental state elements required for burglary and theft. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(1) (1996); S££ Utah Code. Ann. §§76-6-202; 76-6-408 
(1996). It also precisely tracks language approved by the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Maestas. 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) ("You are instructed that in every crime or 
public offense there must be a union or joint operation of the act and intent.") 
In sum, the instructions by the trial court on mental state were correct. 
Therefore, since defendant has failed to establish that the trial court's instructions were 
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error, he has failed to meet even the first prong of the test for plain error. Reyes. 861 
P.2d at 1057. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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